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Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance
Douglas G. Baird* & Robert K. Rasmussen∗∗
Abstract
Traditional approaches to corporate governance focus exclusively
on shareholders and neglect the large and growing role of creditors.
Today’s creditors craft elaborate covenants that give them a large
role in the affairs of the corporation. While they do not exercise
their rights in sunny times when things are going well, these are
not the times that matter most. When a business stumbles, creditors
typically enjoy powers that public shareholders never have, such as
the ability to replace the managers and install those more to their
liking. Creditors exercise these powers even when the business is
far from being insolvent and continues to pay its debts. Bankruptcy
provides no sanctuary as senior lenders ensure that their powers
either go unchecked or are enhanced. The powers that modern
lenders wield rival in importance the hostile takeover in
disciplining poor or underperforming managers. This essay
explores these powers and begins the task of integrating this lever
of corporate governance into the modern account of corporate law.

In 2003, Krispy Kreme was the darling of Wall Street. Its stock had more
than quadrupled since first going public only a few years before. Krispy Kreme’s
CEO also served as chairman of its board, and he had been with the company for

*

Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago.

∗∗

Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. We thank Ian
Ayres, Steve Kaplan, Ed Morrison, Ed Rubin, David Skeel, Cass Sunstein,
Randall Thomas, Bob Thompson, Ron Trost, and Christopher Yoo for their help.
Earlier versions of this paper was presented at the October 2002 meeting of the
National Bankruptcy Conference, and the law schools at Boalt Hall, Chicago,
Columbia, Vanderbilt and Virginia.

Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights and Financial Distress—Page 1

more than 25 years. No one was more dedicated to the business. His wedding
cake was made out of hundreds of Krispy Kreme doughnuts. His infectious
enthusiasm and aggressive growth strategy were going to make the business
another Starbucks. The cover story in Fortune concluded on decidedly upbeat
note:
Unless the fat police run riot across this land, Krispy Kreme is here to
stay. It isn’t some fly-by-night dot-com. There’s 66 years of history here.
It’s a product that people not only love but understand. (Quick, what
does InfoSpace do?) The world is always filled with unknowns, never
more so than right now. With all that’s wrong out there, sometimes it’s
easy to lose focus on the big picture. So take a second and ask yourself:
Is the American dream still alive? Is Krispy Kreme for real? Don’t bet
against it.
Krispy Kreme’s fortunes, however, took a turn for the worse over the next few
months. A low-carb craze was dampening growth. News accounts suggested
that its accounting practices were too aggressive. The stock declined
precipitously, and the predictable security class actions and SEC investigations
followed shortly thereafter. The board met to take stock. It fired the CEO and
replaced him with a complete stranger. This stranger was the CEO of a failed
energy business—and not just any failed energy business. Krispy Kreme hired
the CEO of Enron, and allowed him to remain at Enron while serving
simultaneously as CEO of Krispy Kreme.
Conventional accounts of corporate governance simply cannot explain how
a board that had worked long with a highly praised and firmly entrenched CEO
would dump him within several months of the first signs of trouble and replace
him with a part-timer from Enron. This is not to say that the decision was bad or
counter to the interests of the shareholders. Indeed, the stock went up in reaction
to the news. But boards hand-picked by a CEO are not supposed to lose faith so
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quickly. Dispersed shareholders have no say over the choice of the CEO and in
any event Krispy Kreme’s shareholders held no meeting and did no voting
between the time the bad news first hit and the time the CEO was fired. No
hostile takeover loomed on the horizon and for good reason. The market for
corporate control does little work in an environment in which the books of the
business are untrustworthy. Something is missing from standard accounts of
corporate governance.
In our essay, we identify this missing lever of corporate governance—the
control that creditors exercise through elaborate loan covenants. Bondholders
typically can do little until a corporation defaults on a loan payment. Even then,
their remedies are limited. Not so with bank debt or debt issued by nonfinancial
institutions. These loans—and their volume now exceeds half a trillion dollars a
year—come with elaborate covenants covering everything from minimum cash
receipts to timely delivery of audited financial statements. When a business trips
one of the wires in a large loan, the lender is able to exercise de facto control
rights—such as replacing the CEO of a company—that shareholders of a public
company simply do not have.
Corporate law and in particular rules of corporate governance properly
include all the ways in which investors exercise control over the affairs of the
corporation. Hence, one must take into account the rights that creditors acquire
through contract. Loan covenants now are the principal mechanism for handling
one of the most challenging problems in corporate governance, the one that
arises when a once effective manager needs replacing and the operations of the
business must go through a fundamental overhaul. In the case of Krispy Kreme,
the failure to deliver third quarter financial statements violated various bank
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loan covenants. This was enough to give control to the banks. To maintain its
ongoing operations, the business needed to secure waivers from the banks. The
price the banks demanded for the waivers included the head of the CEO and the
installation in his stead of a seasoned turnaround specialist.
This essay focuses on the way in which loan covenants now play a central
role in corporate governance. When a business enters financial distress, the major
decisions – whether the CEO should go, whether the business should search for a
suitor, whether the corporation should file for Chapter 11—require the blessing
of the banks.1 We first review in a general fashion the way in which rights of
corporate governance are commonly shaped through contract. We then explore
how loan covenants work in conjunction with the more familiar instruments of
corporate governance and follow with an examination of the way in which these
contractual rights have reshaped the dynamics of Chapter 11. We conclude with
a few observations on the potential risks associated with this lever of corporate
governance.

We use the word “banks” to include both traditional banks and other private
lenders. Non-bank private lending accounts for a substantial portion of lending
to those companies with poor credit ratings. See David J. Denis & Vassil T.
Mihov, The Choice Among Bank Debt, Non-Bank Private Debt and Public Debt:
Evidence from New Corporate Borrowings, working paper at 26 (June 2002)
(reporting that in 1995 and 1996, for corporations with over $100 million in
assets, there were 317 public debt issues, 299 bank borrowings, and 110 non-bank
private borrowings, with the private borrowings exhibiting low credit quality).
Given the rise of the secondary market for syndicated bank loans, it is often the
case that bank loans, at the time of distress, end up being held by institutions that
are not banks. Moreover, in today’s market for distressed loans, we see
competition between banks and non-banks. In light of these developments, we
find it unhelpful for the aims of this paper to distinguish between bank and nonbanks, and use the term “banks” to include all private lenders.
1
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I. Corporate Governance and the Power of Contract
On its face, corporate law vests authority to run a corporation in the board
of directors. Shareholders, in turn, elect the directors, approve charter
amendments and by-laws, and pass on certain extraordinary actions. Corporate
governance debates center on whether the law should alter this allocation.2 Legal
processes and rules are needed because exogenous events create a mismatch
between the incentives of the individual investors that possess control rights and
what is in the best interest of the investors as a whole. Shareholders, as residual
claimants, serve as good proxies for all investors when the business is flush. They
bear both the costs and benefits of the operation of the enterprise, but they do not
actually control the day-to-day affairs of the business and cede decisionmaking
over all but a handful of matters to directors and officers. They nominally have
the right to elect directors, but, given the dispersion of shares, the board is
effectively self-perpetuating.3
In such a world, we face the problem that Berle and Means brought to the
surface many decades ago—the separation of ownership and control. The
challenge of corporate law lies in ensuring that the interests of the shareholders

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 833 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. L. Rev. 547 (2003); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999); Martin
Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. Law. 67 (2003).

2

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus.
Law. 43, 45-46 (2003) (reporting that, over a seven-year period, there were on
average 11 challenges to incumbent directors, with less than two of these
challenges occurring at corporations valued at over $200 million).
3
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remain foremost in the minds of those in charge of the business. CEOs may place
perks above profits. We need well-designed compensation contracts to tie the
wealth of the CEO to the well being of the shareholders.4 Managers can place
their friends on the board.5 These friends do not ask hard questions on a host of
issues, ranging from the operation of the business to the compensation of the
CEO and her team.6 We need independent directors and greater shareholder
input to check their incentives to pursue their self-interest to the detriment of the
corporation as a whole. Directors enjoy serving on boards. We need to provide
incentives that they will sell the business when a buyer appears.7 While one finds

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories
and Evidence, 9 Del. J. Corp. L. 540 (1984); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You Pay, but How, 68 Harv. Bus. Rev. 138
(1990); John E. Core, Wayne Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity
Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 Econ. Policy Rev. 27 (2003). For an
argument that excessive agency cost afflict the current method of setting
executive pay, see Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE
(Harvard 2004).
4

See Anil Shivdasamf & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New
Board Members, 54 J. Fin. 1829, 1833-34 (1999) (finding direct CEO in appointment
of directors in 47% of corporations studied).
5

The more entrenched managers are of a parent corporation, the more likely they
are to provide similar entrenchment to their fellow managers when the parent
spins off a subsidiary. See Robert Daines and Michael Klausner, Agents Protecting
Agents: An Empirical Study of Takeover Defenses in Spinoffs, working paper (Dec. 16,
2004).
6

The classic formulation of the problem can be found in Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981). For a recent exchange on this topic,
compare Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1037
(2002) with Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate
Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973 (2002).
7
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vehement disagreement over how the law should allocate control between
shareholders and directors, the law makes the allocation in the first instance. Any
change occurs through the cumbersome process of amending the corporate
charter.
According to this conventional account, creditors receive no special rights
against the corporation. The creditor’s power is limited to suing the debtor when
it fails to pay as promised. They do not have their hands on the levers of power.
When financial woes strike, the board’s fiduciary duties do shift from the
shareholders to the creditors.8 This shift, however, provides little recourse. One
searches in vain for directors ever being held liable for violating their duties to
creditors. Creditors can protect themselves by setting out specific covenants in
their loan agreements, but such protection is not a part of corporate governance
in all but the most general sense. Under the prevailing view, debt performs a
disciplining role only in the sense that the obligation to repay the loan forces the
managers to focus on the bottom line. Debt constrains the actions of managers
and reduces the consumption of perks, but creditors do not play an active role in
the governance of the corporation.9 In the standard model, debt is diversely held
among public bondholders who rely on an indenture trustee to guard their
interests.10 The indenture trustee, however, can do no more than insist on rigid

See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duties Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Director’s Duty to Creditors, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485 (1993).
8

For evidence that adding leverage can increase the value of the corporation, see
Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly is Financial (Note Economic)
Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J.
Fin. 1443 (1998).
9

10

Of course, the differences between public bondolders and private debt has not
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compliance with the bond covenants. She cannot exert any active role in the
affairs of the corporation, as she lacks the power to alter the essential terms of the
loan without the unanimous consent of the bondholders.
The standard account neglects the role that bank and noninstitutional debt
plays in the world of corporate finance. There are few limits on their ability to
insert any conditions or covenants in their loan agreements. While corporate
charters are relatively short documents, loan contracts routinely exceed a
hundred pages. These loan agreements define defaults in ways that give
creditors as much control over the board and its decisions as shareholders.
Indeed, in the limit, these covenants can obliterate the difference between debt
and equity. The line between debt and equity is an entirely permeable one, in
terms of both cash flow rights and control rights. Put-call parity tells us that, with
the right combination of derivative instruments, one can achieve any
configuration of cash flow rights—straight debt, straight equity or any flavor in
between. To a very large extent, the same is true for control rights as well. Rights
that we ordinarily associate with shareholders, such as the right to elect members
of the board or veto sales of the business, often reside elsewhere.11

gone completely unnoticed. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond, Financial
Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 Rev. Econ. Stud. 393 (1984) (noting
that banks are better monitors than public debt holders); Eugene Fama, What’s
Different About Banks?, 15 J. Monetary Econ. 29 (1985) (same).
We have developed these ideas in a series of previous papers. See Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from Enron, 55 Vand. L.
Rev. 1787 (2002) (“Here then is the third lesson of Enron. The basic decisions in a
reorganization ought to begin with an examination of the way in which control
rights are allocated. Their coherence or lack of coherence tell us how much work
the bankruptcy judge must do.”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The
End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 651 (2002); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
11

Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights and Financial Distress—Page 8

The role of contracting is readily observable at the time a business is
formed. The entrepreneur and the venture capitalists care about the way cash
flow rights and control rights are allocated between them, not the formal labels
attached to these rights.12 Whether the venture capitalist formally fits into the
pigeonhole of “creditor” or “shareholder” is something they care about only if
something turns on it. Venture capitalists often invest in several different
countries, each with its own legal system. The details of the legal system are
important only in that the investment contracts must take them into account.13
For example, a venture capitalist in the United States may want to prevent a
business from filing for Chapter 11, but otherwise enjoy all the usual attributes of
a creditor. To achieve this result, the venture capitalist becomes a preferred
shareholder and takes steps to ensure that no other creditors of any consequence
come into being. The venture capitalist has the same priority rights and the same
cashflow rights as a creditor, but the business will not even be eligible for
bankruptcy because, as a formal matter, it has no creditors. 14 The same venture

Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of
Corporate Reorganizations, 87 Va. L. Rev. 921 (2001).
See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev. Econ. Stud.
281 (2003).
12

When we look at venture capital deals across different countries, we find that
differences in the legal systems are relatively unimportant. Success turns on the
sophistication of the contracts that the venture capitalist rights. See Steven N.
Kaplan, Frederic Martel & Per Strömberg, How Do Legal Differences and Learning
Affect Financial Contracts?, (Dec. 2003).
13

Of course, nothing is certain and sometimes creditors can arise, but such risks
are manageable. For torts, insurance provides compensation for all but the most
extreme calamities. For suppliers and the like, the cost that an inadvertent
14
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capitalist in Sweden does not face the equivalent of Chapter 11.15 She might do
the same deal and enjoy the same control rights and cash flow rights, but
formally be a creditor.
More is going on, of course, than merely contracting around such things as
bankruptcy law. A venture capital firm invests in only a discrete part of the life
cycle of a business. In start-up ventures, the allocation of control rights is a
relatively straightforward and prominent problem. The entrepreneur who
possesses the idea has the incentives to develop the concept and bring it to
market. As long as things progress well, she is well positioned to make the
decisions. When things go poorly, the principal question is whether the project
should continue (with either the entrepreneur or someone else in charge), be sold
to another entity, or be shut down.
More time may be needed to make a final decision on the fate of the
venture, the entrepreneur may need to be replaced by someone with more
managerial experience, or it may be that the once promising idea simply cannot
survive in the marketplace. The venture capital firm is particularly well
positioned to make this decision. Successful venture capitalists face a high
opportunity cost of continuing projects that will not produce a positive return. It
is thus not surprising that the venture capitalist is almost always vested with the
shutdown decision. She possesses the power to decide whether to liquidate the
business regardless of whether she is formally a preferred stockholder, a creditor,

creditor can impose is capped by the amount of its claim.
Swedish bankruptcy law provides for a mandatory cash auction of failed
corporations. See Per Strömberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in
Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J. Fin. 2641 (2000).
15
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or something else entirely.16
Investment contracts, of course, must specify precisely when the venture
capitalist will acquire control over the company. These contracts cannot detail
every contingency that may arise. Hence, the challenge for contact drafters is to
find suitable proxies. Control should shift when it is likely that the entrepreneur
may be unduly biased toward continuation—either of the project or her role in
it—and when there is little threat of the venture capital firm attempting to
appropriate more of the upside gains for itself.
The proxies used tend to be objective “milestones” that can easily be
verified by both parties and, if necessary, a court. Typical milestones that transfer
control are tied to the failure to meet various goals set out in the business plan,
such as whether the venture has met cash-flow projections, produced a working
prototype, or found a specified number of customers by a fixed date. Control
transfers even though the financial instruments that the corporation has issued
remain unchanged. The transfer of control, of course, does not mean that the
business will be shut down, only that the decision is placed in the hands of
someone better positioned to make that decision.17 And this person often has the

16

See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note --.

This is not to say, of course, that the venture capital firm will always make the
optimal decision. For example, given the high opportunity cost of the time of the
venture firm, once it decides to shut down a project, it may not spend much time
finding the buyer who will pay the highest possible price. Rather, our point is
only that, as between the parties in whom the shutdown decision could be
vested, the venture firm has the better incentives to make the correct decision.
17
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formal legal attribute of a creditor.18
The way in which the allocation of control rights depart from the traditional
paradigm early in the life cycle of the business is only one illustration of the way
in which control rights—and hence powers of corporate governance—are
customized to suit the needs of a business at different times. Different challenges
arise at various points in the life-cycle of a business. At conception, the open
question is the soundness of the business plan.19 In the first few years, the
founder of the business may also be the one developing the technology. The
success of her efforts and the business are one and the same. The question for the
investors is not one of choosing the CEO, but how long to back her before pulling
the plug.
But when the business succeeds and grows, the investors no longer face the
question of shutting down the business, but whether the founder is also the
person equipped to lead the business through its adolescence. The entrepreneur
with the visionary idea may need to be replaced by seasoned managers who
excel at developing the infrastructure of the business. While they are successful,
close supervision is unnecessary and often counterproductive. The venture
capitalist who can closely monitor the young company exits and is replaced by

Again, we are not asserting that this person has to be a creditor. The venture
capitalist, in this country at least, has the legal status of a preferred stockholder.
Our point is that the legal status itself is not itself important when control rights
are (as is always the case in venture capital deals) a creature of contract.
18

Venture-backed businesses that eventually go public retain the same business
plan throughout their development. Managers, in contrast, often turn over.
Indeed, managers are more likely to leave the corporation than are other capital
assets. See Steven N. Kaplan, et al., What are Firms? Evolution from Birth to Public
Companies, working paper (January 2005).
19
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public shareholders and by public and private debtholders.
The nature of the business often affects its capital structure. A business that
makes fashions for teenagers might be set up along the following lines. Because
the clothes themselves are made overseas, the company’s suppliers (or their
intermediaries) are likely to insist on a standby letter of credit that insures they
will be paid.20 To obtain such a letter, the corporation will have to have a credit
line with a bank. Apart from this credit line, however, the principal challenge
facing the owners when designing the capital structure is to find the right CEO,
to give that person the right set of incentives, and to put a governance structure
in place that removes the CEO if necessary. In such an environment, investors do
not need the attributes typically associated with creditors.
While the investors can make judgments about the sort of person most
likely to make these decisions well, they cannot know perfectly nor can they
review decisions as the CEO makes them. Quite the contrary, to give any
investors the ability to micromanage the CEO’s fashion judgment invites
disaster. The CEO is hired precisely because she is supposed to have a
comparative advantage on this score over the investors. These investors need a
capital structure that gives the CEO slack for a season or two, but still allows the
investors to dump her if she has not been successful. Apart from the credit line
(which may never be drawn upon), the capital structure may consist largely of
equity, but held by a relatively small number of investors who also sit on the

For an example of litigation growing out of such an arrangement, see P.A.
Bergner & Co. v. Bank One, 140 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 1998).
20
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board.21
One way to understand how control rights shift over the life cycle of a
business is through the following thought experiments. Consider a business that
has a single owner (or, more likely, a consortium of investors that can effectively
act as one). Perhaps the business went through a leveraged buyout several years
before, or maybe it is a relatively new enterprise that has already found its
footing in the marketplace. The business is thriving. The CEO is the driving force
behind the business and responsible for much of the success it has enjoyed. The
owner now wants to sell the business and must decide on the capital structure
and a system of corporate governance that will maximize its value (and hence
the amount the owner can realize in the sale). What about an all-equity capital
structure brought about through an initial public offering to a group of passive
and widely dispersed shareholders? How well will this mechanism work at the
outset? How well will it work going forward? How can it change? How will
these changes make things better or worse?
A diversely held, all-equity capital structure gives the CEO enormous
freedom. In time, the board will consist largely of those whom she picks. They
are not likely to rein her in and the shareholders will exercise virtually no
oversight. Notwithstanding these features, such a capital structure at the time of
initial public offering may make sense. Granting the CEO freedom is in the first
instance a good idea. The business’s success and promising future derives from
her skill and the course she has set for the business. Her stock and options aligns

See Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Karen H Wruck, Asset Liquidity, Debt
Covenants, and Managerial Discretion in Financial Distress: The Collapse of L.A.
Gear, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2002).
21.
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her interests with those of the enterprise. An active board with many layers of
oversight may be contrary to the interests of the owners. Second-guessing her
acquisition plans and fly-specking her compensation contract does not advance
the interests of the enterprise.
Consider now a different kind of business, a mature corporation with
steady cash flows. Investors face the danger that those in charge will fail to focus
on maximizing cash flow.22 The investors therefore often put in place a capital
structure that requires the people running this business to distribute cash on a
continual basis. They can do this by having the corporation issue short-term debt
that requires the managers to go to the market repeatedly.23 Alternatively, they
may have the enterprise pay cash dividends to the stockholders.24 Finally, they
can put substantial leverage in the company that requires the payment of
periodic interest on the pain of default. Failure to live up to any of these
obligations—the ability to turn over short-term debt, the payment of dividends
or the default on long-term debt—can spell the beginning of the end for the
current managers. The configuration of control rights of a business at any
moment turns on the nature of the business it is in, the economic conditions in
which it finds itself and its financial obligations.
There are any number of different ways to parcel out cashflow rights and
control rights. No one is necessarily better than any other. For all these

See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance,
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
22.

23

See id.

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74
Am. Econ. Rev. 650, 654 (1984).
24
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configurations, however, their suitability turns not merely on the business at the
moment the rights are put in place, but also on how they will work when things
go wrong. Hence, any assessment of a particular governance regime requires
taking into account how it will function in bad states of the world.

II. State-Contingent Control Rights and Mature Businesses
CEOs of once-thriving businesses sometimes lose their touch. They exhaust
the fount of ideas that brought their initial success. The business environment
changes and the attributes of the CEO that made her the right person to run the
business a few years ago are not well-suited to the current challenges. Investors
as a group need some mechanism to protect them when the person in charge can
no longer find the right path. Here the levers of corporate governance need to
influence, and when necessary replace, wayward managers.
Since the 1970s, academics have pointed to the market for corporate control
as the mechanism best suited to minimize the costs of the separation between
owners and managers. When the CEO no longer deploys the assets of the
corporation in a way that maximizes shareholder value, a hostile raider can take
over the business and set matters aright. Moreover, the possibility of a hostile
takeover ensures that managers keep their more base impulses in check. But in
recent years, the weaknesses of the hostile takeover as a disciplining device have
become manifest. A staggered board coupled with the unfettered ability of the
board of directors to adopt a poison pill largely immunizes most businesses from
the market for corporate control.25

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan.
25
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Recent reform proposals do not seem to be effective replacements for the
market for corporate control. One can find calls to increase the incidence of
independent directors, but the available empirical evidence casts doubt on their
ability to protect shareholders.26 Sarbanes-Oxley—even assuming that it is
effective27—combats fraud, not sloth. It does nothing to replace managers who
are honest but inept. The public investors can exit by selling their investments,
but they have no ability to rectify matters when a CEO stumbles. Often they lack
access to crucial information—such as whether the CEO in fact needs replacing
or whether the business is merely going through a rough patch. Shareholders are
passive, cannot act quickly, and in any event typically do not hire and fire
corporate officers.
The difficulties Warnaco faced several years ago when its CEO faltered
provides an illustration of how creditor control can work when the traditional
levers of corporate governance do not. Warnaco is a publicly traded Fortune 500
company that that manufactured and distributed intimate apparel, name-brand
jeans, and swimwear. A small group of investors acquired it in a leveraged
buyout in the late 1980s. Under the leadership of its hard-driving CEO, it shed

L. Rev. 887, 890 (2002) (having an effective staggered board increases chances of
corporation remaining independent 12 months after a hostile bid from 31% to
64%); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards,
working paper at 14 (reporting that 60% of the publicly traded corporations they
examined had staggered boards).
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to
Symposium Participants, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 885, 895-900 (2002).
26

For an argument that it is not, see Roberto Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, working paper.
27
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debt, streamlined operations, and became an effective competitor in the
marketplace. Warnaco became a publicly traded corporation once again in 1991,
and it flourished in the 1990s as it acquired licenses to sell some highly visible
brand names (including Calvin Klein jeans). As Warnaco’s fortunes were rising
and its CEO was performing well, control rights were largely invested in her. She
set the enterprise’s strategy. The board was neither independent nor terribly
active. She was well compensated for her efforts, receiving $158 million in salary
and bonuses between 1993 and 1998. Warnaco’s debt was spread across twenty
different banks and it was unsecured.28
During the time that it flourished, Warnaco seemed a classic example of a
business with a firmly entrenched manager.29 The CEO also served as chair of the

On the general tendency of health, large companies not to secure their debt, see
Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 629
(1997); Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk,
25 J. Monetary Econ. 21, 27-40 (1990).
28

Entrenchment of existing managers is the central focus of modern corporate
law scholarship. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What
Matters in Corporate Governance, working paper at 5 (Nov. 2004) (“We take the
view * * * that arrangements that protect incumbent from removal or its
consequences are harmful to shareholders. * * * Those concerned about insulation
from intervention or removal by shareholders have been most concerned about
the adverse effects that entrenchment can have on management behavior and
incentives.”)Modern indices of corporate governance include things such as
whether there is an effective staggered board, see Bebchuk, et al., supra note --,
whether shareholders’ voting power on by-law amendments, charter
amendments and merger is constrained, Bebchuk, et al, What Matters, at 6-7, the
extent to which boards have adopted protections against hostile takeovers, see id.
at 8-9, and whether there are a majority of independent directors, see Sanjai
Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. Corp. L. 231 (2002). The “governance index”
29
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board. Half of the six-member staggered board were insiders. The CEO had
picked her “independent” directors from her circle of social friends and
professional colleagues. They were uninvolved in the activities of the business
while it enjoyed good times. Warnaco made Business Week’s list of “The Worst
Board of Directors” in 1996, largely due to the Board’s lack of independence.30
The freedom given the CEO, however, may be not so much the product of lax
corporate governance as what made sense for someone with a long and
consistent track record. The corporate governance challenge, from the
perspective of the investors as a group, was not in corralling the CEO’s decisions
while she was doing well, but ensuring that action was taken soon enough when
she went bad.
In the late 1990s, Warnaco invested unsuccessfully in a chain of Calvin
Klein jeans outlet stores. Warnaco borrowed heavily to acquire new brands
(including $530 million to reacquire Authentic Fitness, maker of Speedo
swimwear, which it had spun off in the early 1990s). Warnaco also borrowed to
repurchase its own stock. Over the course of a single year, Warnaco’s debt grew
from $500 million to $1.5 billion. The CEO had stumbled. Neither shareholder
action nor the market for corporate control would set matters aright, regardless
of how much the business adhered to the conventional canons of good corporate
governance. Nevertheless, the CEO was put under a tight rein and then

created by the Investor Responsibility Research Center and used in a number of
recent papers focus exclusively on the relationship between the board and
shareholders. See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate
Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. Econ. 107 (2003); Bebchuk, et al., What
Matters, supra.
See The Worst Board of Directors, available at
http//:www.businessweek.com/1996/48/b35035.htm
30
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displaced.
The shift in control came about as a result of Warnaco’s need to restructure
its debt. Warnaco remained solvent,31 but it was no longer able to borrow on an
unsecured basis from twenty different banks. It had to fold this debt into a
revolving credit facility controlled by a handful of banks.32 This transaction gave
the banks a security interest in substantially all of Warnaco’s assets, including its
cash flow. Warnaco would only receive operating funds with the continued
blessings of the banks. Once the revolving credit facility was in place, control
rights had shifted. From that point forward, the banks that ran the revolving
credit facility essentially controlled the corporation.33 The revolver gave the
banks the ability to veto any extraordinary transaction. Moreover, the business
was put on a short leash. The management knew that its continued employment

Although the stock traded for much less than it had in better times,
sophisticated investors were still buying it, as was the CEO.
31

While debt of this sort is often syndicated among a number of banks, the
general understanding is that the lead bank will perform the bulk of the
monitoring of the debtor.
32

Laws that protect junior creditors from transactions that advance the interests
of senior lenders at their expense generally have too short a reach-back period to
provide them with much protection. The preference period generally runs only
90 days. Senior lenders will generally not be treated as insiders, and even here
the preference period runs only a year. Pledging the assets usually can be done
far enough in advance to ensure that none of these problems arise. For example,
in the case of Interstate Bakeries, Interstate had no secured debt as of July 18,
2001. Its unsecured debt was a tad less than $600 million. The next, Interstate
entered into a new credit facility. This facility brought additional liquidity – it
was for $800 million. All of the prior debt was paid off. The cost, however, was
that the new facility was secured by substantially all of the assets of the business.
See 2001 Annual Report at 22.
33
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depended on reversing the recent slide.34 The incentives for those beholden to
equity to engage in unduly risky transactions as the corporation nears insolvency
were firmly checked.
The presence of such an institutional lender fundamentally alters corporate
governance. The lending agreement contains many affirmative and negative
covenants that give the lender de facto control over every aspect of the business.
Moreover, the complete control the lender has over the debtor’s cash flows gives
the lender veto power over every course of action, whether internal to the
corporation or outside it. Decisions normally reserved for directors and
stockholders—such as whether to sell a division, change the business plan or
replace the managers—require the lender’s explicit blessing. Trip wires are tied
to the performance of the business and its discrete units and a general provision
allows the lender to call the loan in the event of any material adverse change.35
Several decades ago, institutional creditors could not exercise this much
control. Before Article 9 was enacted, acquiring a security interest in all of a
company’s property was hard.36 Each type of collateral had its own legal regime.

Replacement of the CEO would more than likely require a bankruptcy filing.
The severance portion of her compensation contract was $43 million. Indeed, she
was replaced in bankruptcy, and the company rejected her contract. She sued
Warnaco seeking $25 million under the contract, but settled the case for less than
$500,000.
34

The notion of default clauses in lending agreements as trip wires designed to
signal to the lender that it needs to step up its monitoring activity was first set
out in Ronald J. Daniels & George Triantis, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1073, 1093-94 (1995).
35

36

See 1 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 1-286 (Little,
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Moreover, courts viewed with suspicion omnibus clauses that picked up all of
the debtor’s property and provided no cushion for other creditors.37 In many
instances, secured lending was premised upon the creditor’s ability to take
possession of discrete assets and sell them in the event that the debtor defaulted.
It was not possible to make a secured loan premised upon the corporation’s
value as a going concern. Article 9 and especially revised Article 9 have made it
possible for lenders to acquire all of a corporation’s assets.38 The modern security
interest effectively covers not only a corporation’s discrete assets, but also the
synergy that each asset has with the other. The expanded security interest not
only changes the basis on which the lender extend credit, but also the control that
the creditor can exercise over the business.39
Modern business practices also enhance a creditor’s ability to control a
corporation. In many highly competitive industries, successful companies must
actively manage their cash flows. The institutional lender not only takes a
security interest in all of the debtor’s assets, but also actively manages the
debtor’s cash flows through a revolving credit facility. A creditor can now

Brown 1965).
37

See, e.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).

Perhaps most notably, revised Article 9 made it possible for a lender to take a
security interest in a debtor’s deposit accounts. See 9-104(l) of Old Article 9. See
also Comment 16 to 9-109 of new 9 (“[D]ebtors who wished to use deposit
accounts as collateral sometimes were precluded from doing so as a practical
matter.”)
38

For an important and early recognition of the way in which secured credit can
give a lender control rights that encourage the firm to pursue promising
investments, see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986).
39
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acquire a valid security interest in all of a debtor’s assets and ensure that all the
cash coming into the corporation and leaving it passes through its hands.
Modern technology enables the lender to know precisely how much cash a
borrower has at any given time. By virtue of controlling the business’s cash
flows, the creditor is less dependent upon the debtor to tell it what is going on.
The creditor has experience in the industry, and thus can readily distinguish
between cash flow problems related to a general industry down turn and such
problems that are unique to the corporation it is funding. When the debtor’s cash
flow deteriorates, the lender can then invoke the powers that it has contracted for
in the lending agreement.
The ability to cut off a debtor’s cash flows is a much more potent threat
(and gives the creditor much more control over a company) than the threat to
repossess the debtor’s equipment. Turning off the cash stops a debtor dead in its
tracks. Repossessing collateral is a potent threat only if the creditor can reach the
property without breaching the peace.40 Even then, repossessing collateral other
than cash jeopardizes the value of that collateral. A debtor can dispose of its
assets – its inventory, its equipment, etc. – much more effectively than can a
lender. A lender may find that the collateral is worth more in the debtor’s
hands.41 Cash, on the other hand, is worth just as much in the lenders’ hands as is
the debtor’s.
Yet, precipitously turning off the cash is at some level too great a threat.
Just as a secured creditor with a security interest in a machine could not credibly

40

See UCC 9-609.

See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 Mich.
L. Rev. 159 (1997).
41
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threaten to blow up the machine, a secured creditor with a security interest a
corporation’s cash flow is unlikely to abruptly shut down the business. Taking all
the cash on hand today precludes future activity that would generate additional
funds. It destroys the option value of the security interest.42 Rather, the security
interest here serves two roles. At times, it gives the creditor the ability to conduct
a controlled liquidation of the corporation. By limiting the amount of the
advances, it can ensure that funds are only spent on liquidating the current
assets.43 The lender can limit a debtor’s access to cash in a way that it cannot limit
its access to a machine. With the machine, the debtor either has access or it does
not. As to cash, the lender controls the amount of cash that the debtor can spend.
Cash can be a much more nuanced mechanism of control.
The security interest in the debtor’s cash flow serves a second function as
well. Leaving assets unencumbered would allow the debtor to obtain funds from
other sources. The debtor could always attempt to find another lender so as to
continue its operations. By taking a security interest in the cash flow, the
institutional lender leaves the debtor with no exit strategy. The lender monitors
the business’s progress and has the right to decline to provide new funds in full
or reduce the amount that the corporation receives. To induce the lender to
waive loan covenants and otherwise stay its hand, the board takes a more active

On secured credit as an option, see Robert K. Rasmussen, Secured Credit, Control
Rights, and Options, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1935 (2004).
42

See, e.g., In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co., 893 F.2d 693, --- (5th Cir. 1990) (“[The
secured lender] began reducing the percentage advance rates so that [the debtor]
would have just enough cash to pay its direct operating expenses. [The debtor]
used the advances to keep its doors open and to sell inventory, the proceeds of
which were used to pay off the past advances from [the secured lender].”)
43
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role in the business. The debtor has to find a common understanding with the
lender as to the future of the enterprise.44
Institutional creditors do not routinely insist on these revolving credit
facilities. Indeed, when the debtor finds itself in robust financial health, it will
find multiple sources of credit and competition among these limits the terms that
creditors can demand. Managers are reluctant to put their fate in the hands of a
bank consortium, and lenders have no need to meddle in the affairs of a thriving
business. Revolving credit facilities with all the requisite bells and whistles are
expensive to set up and to monitor. When times are good, these are unnecessary.
A creditor may be content to take a security interest in a discrete asset as long as
principal and interest on the loan are less than what the creditor knows it can
realize on the collateral, inside of bankruptcy and out.
Instead, we tend to see industrial strength revolving credit agreements in
environments such as Warnaco. The debtor is in default on existing loan
covenants and has exhausted other sources of capital. Its lender is owed more
than any discrete asset the corporation owns, and thus must depend upon the
value of the business as a going concern in order to ensure repayment.
The desire of a lender to gain control when a business becomes financially
distressed should come as no surprise. Much of the literature on corporate
governance is aimed at reducing agency costs when times are good. Here,

There are reasons to believe that Boards may be overly trusting of the CEO that
they have hired. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat:
Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals about Agency Costs, Self-Deception and
Deceiving Others, draft. Lenders, all else being equal, are less likely to suffer from
this bias.
44
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managers may have an incentive to pursue private benefits rather than maximize
shareholder wealth. Things change when distress occurs. Distress often
foreshadows the replacement of managers and directors.45 They know that they
are in an end-game situation. Final-period problems tend to reduce the efficacy
of controls designed to bind over the long term. Left unchecked, managers are
even more likely to put their interests ahead of those of the company. Lenders
thus institute a new set of controls in order to protect their interest.
The loan agreements for these revolving credit facilities have evolved over
time, but the basic structure remains the same. The agreement sets out negative
and affirmative covenants and defines events of default.46 The various covenants
require the debtor to seek permission from the lender for any major decision
about the enterprise, such as the purchase or sale of any substantial assets
outside the ordinary course of business. The debtor also gives the lender access
to its books and records—information not routinely available even to
shareholders.47 Loan covenants also check the ability of the debtor from using its
cash collateral or borrowing from other creditors. Violations of the covenants are

In the 1980s, few senior managers survived financial distress. See Stuart C.
Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 241, 247 (1989)
(29% of senior managers remain after financial distress); see also Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 669, 723 (1993)
(91% of CEOs replaced during financial distress).
45

If a debtor insists on there being no covenants, the loan will be callable on
demand. See Guide to Asset Based Lending, GE Capital Commercial Finance 16
(1999).
46

On the limits of shareholder access to a corporation’s financial records, see
Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management By
Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 331 (1996).
47
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events of default. A default entitles the creditor to demand repayment of the loan
and to take possession of all the assets of the borrower.
Even declaring a default without seizing collateral has consequences for the
debtor. A default signals to the rest of the world that the debtor is in financial
difficulty and is at loggerheads with its creditors. Change may well be in the
offing. Lenders have virtually unimpeded access to the books of the corporation.
If the lender signals that it has lost confidence in the business by declaring a
default, other investors in the corporation take note. Indeed, a declaration of
default may spur a race to collect from the debtor, which in turn makes a
bankruptcy filing inevitable. Debtors will often grant concessions to lenders to
avoid these consequences. It is not uncommon for a lender to receive an
advanced payment, an increase in interest rate, or more sweeping powers in
exchange for not declaring a default.
A change in the underlying economy alters the relative position of the
borrower and the lender in another way. Fifty years ago small businesses were
often indistinguishable from the owner-manager who ran the company on a dayto-day basis. A creditor could threaten to exercise its rights and exert control over
the business, but such a threat is credible only if the creditor could make use of
the assets. Hence, even if a creditor in fact had a security interest that covered the
entire business and extended credit on the basis of the corporation’s value as a
going concern, the threat to repossess was credible only to the extent that the
secured creditor had the ability to realize the going concern value of the business
without the debtor’s cooperation. Today fewer corporations depend upon the
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firm-specific skills of the manager.48
The ability to replace existing managers has led to what may be the biggest
change in the governance of the corporation in recent times. It is now possible to
bring in turnaround specialists to take over the firm. Both large and small
corporations are routinely sold in the marketplace. Institutional lenders bargain
for the implicit (and sometimes the explicit) power to change the managers.49 A
change in managers or directors without the banks’ explicit blessing is often an
event of default under the loan covenants. The appointment of a new manager, a
Chief Restructuring Officer (“CRO”), may be a condition of the loan. More
commonly, if the business continues to fare badly, the banks may condition the
waiver of loan covenants on the appointment of a CRO. Other times, their
influence is more subtle. With a sophisticated board of directors, the lenders may
need to do no more than make it understood that they will look more kindly on
future waivers of loan covenants if a CRO with whom they have worked before
is in place and cleaning shop.50

We make this point in greater detail in Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 651 (2002).
48

The existing managers may need to stay for a few weeks after the turnaround
specialist arrives. If they have expertise with respect to the firm’s technology or
its markets, they may survive even longer, but the turn-around specialist calls
the shots.
49

By being oblique, they minimize the risk of lender-liability actions outside of
bankruptcy and equitable subordination inside. For boards sensitive to SarbanesOxley and potential shortfalls in D&O insurance, however, hints are usually
sufficient. Boards, of course, are nominally the ones who make the decision, and
creditors stop short of insisting on a particular named individual. But only just
short. In WorldCom, for example, the creditors conditioned the dip financing
upon the appointment of a chief restructuring officer and gave the board
50
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The arrival of a CRO alters the terrain of corporate governance. The CRO is
not a typical member of the management team. Unlike other officers of the
corporation, he does not report to the CEO. Rather, he reports directly to the
board. Whereas the CEO tends to choose other members of his management
team, the CEO has little role into this selection. The CRO is often tasked with
passing judgment on which members of the management team add value and
which ones need to be replaced. Indeed, the Chapter 11 may take place only after
the CRO has had a chance to straighten out the operational problems and the
business has settled on a plan to straighten out its finances.
To get a flavor of this dynamic, return to Warnaco. By spring of 2001,
Warnaco’s fortunes had not improved. At this point, the banks insisted that
Warnaco hire a turn-around specialist as a Chief Restructuring Officer.51 At least
initially, this person would straighten out the finances of the enterprise and pay
attention to its operations, while the CEO would remain in control of Warnaco’s
products and strategic direction. The turnaround specialist hired was Tony
Alvarez, who had previously served as CEO of Phar-Mor and Coleco Industries.
He had been President and COO of Republic Health and Restructuring Advisor
of Resorts International.
Tony Alvarez is one of the most respected turnaround specialists in the
country. Alvarez is one of the two principals of Alvarez & Marsal. The firm
freedom to choose any restructuring officer they pleased—as long as he was one
of the three on a list they provided.

To be precise, the banks did not “insist” on a CRO. They merely “suggested” it.
Members of the board, while long-time social friends and business colleagues of
the CEO, were sufficiently sophisticated to take the hint.
51
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provides a number of services. It sometimes serves as a creditor advisor and
enables “bank groups, bondholders and other investors to clearly evaluate the
risks and opportunities associated with a distressed company’s business plan.”
The firm also does turnaround management consulting. Wearing this hat, the
firm “helps stabilize operations, address liquidity concerns, and position the
company for successful financial or operational restructuring.” The first line of
work gives credibility to the second. As the firm itself puts it, “A&M’s
involvement reassures creditors that the company is taking important steps to
address its problems and maximize its value.” When Alvarez is in place, the
banks have as their war-time general someone whose loyalties are not tied to the
existing managers.52 Alvarez does not plan on staying with companies long. His
loyalties do not run to the shareholders. His future employment prospects turn
on maintaining the confidence of lenders that he can maximize the value of the
enterprise.
Existing legal doctrines force lenders to exercise their control indirectly.
Such doctrines impose risks to lenders who courts, after the fact, view as
exercising direct control over the enterprise. To be sure, concerns over lender
liability have eased over the past decade.53 Courts regularly affirm the right of
the creditor to exercise the rights set out under its loan agreement. As long as it
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The firm’s web site is http://www.alvarezandmarsal.com.

See Sloan v. Zions First National Bank, 990 F.2d 551 (10th Cir. 1993); Kham &
Nate’s Shoes No. 2 v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1990)
(“Although Debtor contends . . . that Bank’s termination of advances frustrated
Debtor’s efforts to secure credit from other sources, and so propelled it down
hill, this is legally irrelevant so long as Bank kept its promises.”).
53

Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights and Financial Distress—Page 30

cuts square corners, it has no duty to look out for the interests of other creditors.54
Still, concerns remain. In Chapter 11, other creditors could seek equitable
subordination. They could claim that the creditor that had so much control over
the debtor that it was able to manipulate its affairs in a way that worked to its
own benefit.55 The law on this score is unsettled enough to cause lenders (or at
least their counsel) to make their intentions known without issuing stark
commands. Similarly, the new and ill-defined tort know as “deepening
insolvency,” which can hold a senior lender liable for propping up the business
while it is insolvent, creates incentives for lenders not to be seen as directly
taking control of the business.56

III. Creditor Control in Chapter 11
Senior creditors retain their hands on the levers of corporate governance
even after the corporation enters Chapter 11. Lenders have devised various
strategies to ensure that their control rights persist (and are even enhanced) after
the debtor files for bankruptcy. Most commonly, creditors do this through their

See, e.g., Smith v. Associates Commercial Corporation, 893 F.2d 693, 702 (5th
Cir. 1990).
54

See, e.g., In re Excide Technologies, Inc., 299 B.R. 732, 743-46 (Bkrtcy.D.Del
2003) (holding that cause of action for equitable subordination stated where
banks were alleged to have used their position to gain “control” over debtor).
55

See, In re Excide Technologies, 299 B.R. at 750-52 (holding that other creditors
had successfully plead the tort where they alleged “that the Lenders caused the
Debtors to acquire [another company with borrowed funds] so that they could
obtain the control necessary to force the Debtors fraudulently to continue its
business for nearly two years at ever-increasing levels of insolvency. The conduct
by the Lenders caused the Debtors to suffer massive losses and become more
deeply insolvent, costing creditors substantial value.”)
56
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control over postpetition financing.57 Warnaco again illustrates the modern
dynamic. By June 2001, Warnaco was in default to its bank lenders. It needed
additional cash to maintain its operations and the banks that controlled the
revolver were under no obligation to provide it. The next step no longer was in
the hands of the managers or the board. The banks could shut down Warnaco
instantly outside of bankruptcy if they choose to do so. Instead, the banks steered
Warnaco towards Chapter 11.
That a senior lender would press for bankruptcy stands conventional
wisdom on its head. It might seem that the directors could hold off the banks by
filing a Chapter 11 petition.58 The Bankruptcy Code and appellate decisions
appear to paint a rather bleak picture for the senior lender seeking to influence
the operation of the business. A Chapter 11 filing puts in place an automatic stay,
that prevents lenders from seizing their collateral.59 They have to wait until a
plan of reorganization was confirmed. Until then, they can insist only on

Of the 93 large, publicly held corporations that concluded reorganization
proceeding in 2002, 51 (55%) of them had debtor-in-possession financing. This is
generally consistent with lending practices from the mid-1990s. See Sandeep
Dahiya, et al., Debtor-in-possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical
Evidence, 69 J. Fin. Econ. 259, 266 (2003) (reporting that in 1995-1997, over 40% of
firms in their sample received DIP financing). Focusing on DIP financing may
understate creditor control to the extent that it does not include cash collateral
orders, which can be the functional equivalent of DIP financing orders.
57

See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 Yale L.J. 1043, 1050-52 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 669, 756-58 (1993) (suggesting that Chapter 11 may
provide “soft landing” for managers).
58

59

See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
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adequate protection of the value of their collateral.60 The time value of their
secured claims is not even protected to the extent they are undersecured.61 At
confirmation, they can only insist on a promise stream of future payments, the
present value of which equals the value of the collateral, with both the value of
the collateral and the discount rate being issues for judicial determination.62 After
all, Chapter 11 is supposed to give a “breathing space” to a beleaguered business
from the collection efforts of its creditors.
In practice, however, modern Chapter 11 provides managers with little
sanctuary from sophisticated lenders. When firms like Warnaco need an infusion
of cash to continue their operations, they must find a postpetition lender. The
market for postpetition lending is quite robust. There are a number of
institutional lenders that specialize in postpetition financing.63 These alternative
sources may insure that the debtor pays a competitive rate for its fresh money;
they do not, however, offer the debtor’s management the ability to roam free of
creditor control. A new lender tends to enter the scene only with the blessings of
the existing one.64 The debtor is going to need to use the cash collateral of the

60

See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).

See United Savings Assoc. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365
(1988).
61

See 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(A). On valuation disputes, see Associates Commercial
Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997). On interest rate disputes, see Till v. SCS Credit
Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
62

Leaders in the area include JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, Wachovia, General
Electric Credit, CIT, Foothill and Cerberus.
63

64

Alternatively, the new lender can buy out the interest of the prior lender.
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existing lender,65 and the new lender will generally insist on a lien that primes
that of the existing lenders. Such arrangements can be put in place with the
consent of the existing lender. To be sure, cash collateral orders can be sought
over the objection of the existing lender. But litigation over such matters could
imperil the reorganization effort at an early stage. More importantly, courts are
unlikely to grant such orders over vigorous opposition.
The typical debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) loan grants the lender virtually
complete control over the reorganization process. The DIP financing agreement
will have many financial covenants, the violation of any of which gives the DIP
lender the ability to terminate the financing. The DIP loan also limits the reach of
bankruptcy’s automatic stay. The DIP lender in the Winn-Dixie bankruptcy
insisted that it could seize any of its collateral upon default, so long as it
provided the debtor with five-days notice.66 The DIP financer provides only
limited degrees of freedom for the business while it remains in Chapter 11. One
provision typically waives the right of the debtor to seek to use the lender’s cash
collateral over the lender’s objection, while another waives the right of the debtor
to seek a priming lien on the secured creditor’s collateral.67 Moreover, the DIP
financing agreement can provide that the loan terminates if the debtor fails to

See 11 USC 362(c)(2) (requiring consent or court approval for the debtor to use
cash collateral) & (e) (requiring adequate protection as a predicate for court
approval).
65

Other provisions, such as a waiver of the right to seek reimbursement under
Section 506(c), the waiver of avoidance actions and the agreement to pay all of
the secured creditor’s expenses, go not so much to control as they do to ensure
that the lender is paid in full.
66

67

Such liens are authorized by Section 364(d) of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. 364(d).
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arrange for a sale of some or all of its assets by a specific date.68
The DIP financier can control both how long the debtor takes to form a plan
and the form the plan ultimately takes. The credit agreement often provides that
it is an event of default if a plan is not filed within a certain period of time.69 Such
a provision has the de facto effect of putting the decision about the length of the
exclusivity period in the hands of the DIP lender rather than the court.70 The
debtor’s freedom to shape a plan of reorganization is limited as well. The DIP
may include among many covenants the promise not to file “of a motion in the
bankruptcy case without Lender’s prior written consent” and “not to the fil[e] of
a plan of reorganization in the bankruptcy case without Lender’s prior written
consent that provides for any treatment of the obligations owing to Lender other
than payment in full in cash on the effective date of such plan.” Provisions such
as these effectively remove the debtor’s power to “cram down” a plan over
creditor dissent.
DIP loans also nullify the rights of shareholders.71 Any change in control,

68

See Warnaco Revolving Credit Agreement §7.16.

69

See Warnaco Revolving Credit Agreement §7.14.

Much of the concern with operation of the Bankruptcy Code in the 1980s and
early 1990s stemmed from the bankruptcy courts’ willingness to continue
indefinitely the debtor’s exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization. See Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wisc. L. Rev. 11.
70

In theory, shareholders still retain the right to replace the board of directors
while the corporation is in bankruptcy. See In re Johns-Manville, 801 F.2d 60 (2d
Cir. 1986); Official Bondholders Committee v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 209 Bankr.
832 (D. Del. 1997).
71
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defined to include a new majority of the board, will be a default on the loan.72
Similarly, the DIP can provide that it is an event of default if its CRO is
replaced.73 Provisions can go further still. The DIP financing agreement in
Warnaco gave the DIP lender a power of attorney.74 In the event of any default,
the DIP lender was entitled “to take any and all appropriate action . . . which
may be necessary and desirable to accomplish the purposes of the Agreement”
including, but not limited to, the sale of any of the debtor’s assets. The agreement
also stipulated that the DIP lender’s exercise of this power of attorney does not
violate the automatic stay. To put this in the language of corporate governance, a
creditor empowered to act as the debtor is not a creditor in the traditional sense at
all.
To be sure, not all courts approve these provisions. Yet, by cobbling
together those provisions that a secured lender knows will pass judicial muster
in the chosen venue (a venue into which the secured lender had considerable
influence),75 the DIP lender can insure that no major decision is made in a way
that it finds objectionable.76 Given the difficulty of obtaining another DIP lender,
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See Winn-Dixie Credit Agreement § 8.1.8 (Feb. 21, 2005).

See Interstate Summary of Terms and Conditions for Revolving Credit and
Letter of Credit Facility, Affirmative Covenants (o) (Sept. 20, 2004).
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See, e.g., Senior Secured Super-Priority Debtor in Possession Revolving Credit
Agreement, In re Warnaco Group, Inc. §11.8 (June 11, 2001).
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See Marcus Cole, “Delaware is Not a State”: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional
Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1845, 1869 (2002).
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Cash collateral orders often contain similar provisions. Agreement on the
part of the lender for the debtor to use cash collateral often include an
76
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the effect of these provisions (coupled with the DIP financer’s unwillingness to
waive them) is to give the DIP financer the ability to control the Chapter 11
case.77
With the creditors in control, the reorganization of Warnaco proceeded
smoothly. Within six months of entering bankruptcy, the CEO was dismissed
and Alvarez became the new CEO. An investment bank shopped all of the
company’s assets, though no bids for the entire business emerged that were
satisfactory to the senior lenders. Instead, some assets were sold and the
company left Chapter 11 less than two years after the case began. The senior
lenders, who were owed more than $2.4 billion, received a cash payment of $104
million, $200 million in new notes, and 96.26% of the equity. The rest of the
equity went to the unsecured creditors and Tony Alvarez, while the erstwhile
shareholders received nothing. Less than two months later, the former President
and CEO of Brooks Brothers took over for Alvarez. Warnaco is once again a
publicly traded company. As to Alvarez, he has moved on and serves as the CEO
for the maker of Wonder Bread and Twinkies, Interstate Bakeries. Interstate is
currently in Chapter 11.

acknowledgement of the validity of the lender’s lien, the promise that the debtor
will not seek to charge the collateral under Section 506(c), the requirement that
debtor receive the lender’s consent before granting any future postpetition liens,
and payment of all of the lender’s expenses.
Creditors once had to demand the appointment of a trustee if they wanted to
displace the management. Under modern Chapter 11 practice, however, they
have no reason to ask the court to order the appointment of the trustee. Indeed, it
is an event of default if such a trustee is appointed. See Winn-Dixie Credit
Agreement § 8.1.10(h).
77
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IV. The Costs and Benefits of Private Debt as a Lever of Corporate Governance
Even while creditor control has yet to hit the radar screen of the general
corporate governance literature, it has become the central issue in bankruptcy
scholarship. One can already find academics bemoaning the power that senior
creditors exercise in reorganizations today.78 These critiques neglect the
connection between creditor control and corporate governance as a general
matter. The control that creditors exercise in bankruptcy is simply the final stage
of a process that begins well outside of bankruptcy. Limiting creditor control in
bankruptcy should not be done in a vacuum. Such changes also affect creditor
control and corporate governance outside of bankruptcy and these must be taken
into account.
Increased creditor control may be, on balance, a salutary development. For
this to be the case, however, at least two things have to be true. First, creditor
control must loom large enough to be a credible threat to managers. Short sticks
do not cast long shadows. Second, creditors’ self-interest must lead them to
exercise control in a way that maximizes the value of the business. Levers of
power can do bad as well as good, and there is little reason to think that creditors
with control rights will advance anyone’s interest except to the extent it advances

See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 19, 24-25
(2004) (“secured creditors, capitalizing upon agency problems to gain the help of
insiders and insolvency professionals [have] effectively take[n] over – or
hijack[ed] – the chapter 11 process and essentially created a federal unified
foreclosure process”); Stephen Lubben, The New and Improved Chapter 11, working
paper; Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, The Creditor in Possession: Creditor
Control of Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 21 Bankr. Strategist 1, 2 (2003); Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 795
(2004).
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their own.

A. The Influence of Private Debt
We can gain some purchase on the power of private debt as a lever of
corporate governance by using hostile takeovers as a benchmark. By common
account, the possibility of a hostile takeover is one of the most important ways of
keeping managers in line. Nevertheless, there are only about twenty hostile
takeovers a year.79 A publicly traded corporation is five times more likely to file a
Chapter 11 petition than be subject to a hostile takeover,80 and, as Krispy Kreme
illustrates, the businesses that enter Chapter 11 are only a fraction of those
subject to the discipline of creditor control.81
The possibility of creditor control exists any time a business takes on a
substantial loan, and these are commonplace in the life on a publicly traded

In their path-breaking piece on the effect of staggered boards, Bebchuk, Coates
and Subramanian’s comprehensive search uncovered only 92 hostile bids over a
five-year period.
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During the same time period as Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian’s
comprehensive search (1996-2000) found 92 hostile takeovers, 622 publicly
traded corporations filed for bankruptcy. Of these, 186 had assets that exceed
$100 million, measured in 1980 dollars. See The 2004 Bankruptcy Yearbook &
Almanac 70 (New Generations Research). It might seem that hostile takeovers
are only a tip of the iceberg, as they now represent only a small part of M&A
activitiy and some negotiated mergers may be hostile takeovers by another
name. But anecdotes from those engaged in the takeover business and empirical
evidence suggest that the possibility of a hostile offer has little impact on
negotiated mergers. See Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover
Defenses, 113 Yale L.J. 621 (2003).
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In a previous paper, we document the extent of creditor control for all large
businesses that exited Chapter 11 in 2002. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note x.
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corporation. For example, one study reports that in the two years 1995 and 1996,
there were over four hundred large private loans to public corporations owning
more than $100 million in assets.82 The sources of private debt include both
traditional banks and companies such as GE Capital and Cerberus that specialize
in lending to corporations that are facing financial difficulties.
The secondary market for distressed debt provides further evidence of the
importance of creditor control. Creditor control is likely to manifest itself when a
loan becomes distressed. Most large loans are arranged by a lead bank, but
financed by a syndicate of banks. This allows banks to spread their risk. The
norm is for the lead bank to hold the largest share of the loan and to perform
most of monitoring, for which it receives a fee. The lead bank does not typically
sell its interest. There is, however, a secondary market for those portions of the
loan held by other members of the syndicate. If one defines “distressed debt” as
those loans that trade at less than 90% of face value, in 2002, over $40 billion in
loans changed hands. This represented 42% of all of the trading in the secondary
loan market for that year.
The possibility of creditor control may matter as much as whether it is
actually exercised even more than the threat of a hostile takeover. Staggered
boards drastically reduce the threat of a hostile takeover, but there is no
comparable device to limit creditors. Managers have no way to protect
themselves against creditor control once they take on debt. In theory, a business
can rid itself of a creditor who presses too hard, but a business that encounters

These loans are only those large enough to have a material effect on the
finances of the business and thus trigger an SEC filing Denis & Mihov, supra note
--, at 26.
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difficulty with a private creditor is likely to have trouble replacing it with
another. Any new lender has to worry about private information. The existing
lender may want out for reasons that are not yet plain to outsiders. Any new
lender is in any event bound to insist upon its own control rights to protect itself.
Private debt is thus a widely used lever of corporate control. Moreover, it
can do work in situations where the other levers have little effect. The threat of a
hostile takeover looms larger over an all-equity corporation than creditor
control.83 On the other hand, in the presence of fraud or, as in the case of Krispy
Kreme, uncertainty about the bookkeeping and the financial affairs of the
business, hostile takeovers cannot be depended upon. Outsiders need to be able
to trust the books. Creditor control is the mechanism of choice, as they can force
the replacement of the CFO and get to the bottom of things. Indeed, the hostile
takeover may do some work in this environment only because the lenders act
first. Their insistences on a CRO and a new CFO, along with the filing of a
Chapter 11 petition, may create an environment in which the market for
corporate control can once again operate effectively.84

B. Private Debt, Self-Interest, and Investor Welfare
Private lenders are not charitable institutions. They will act to maximize
their rate of return when they engineer the appointment of a CRO or otherwise

Even here, however, the possibility of creditor control casts some shadow. Any
step a manager (whether it is empire-building or excessive consumption of
perks) that might force her to credit markets is one that she takes knowing that
creditors will not sit idly by when things start going wrong.
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Indeed, more than half of all large Chapter 11s are sales. See Baird &
Rasmussen, supra note x.
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exercise their influence. The crucial question is the extent to which private
lenders act in a way that is consistent with the interests of all the investors in the
corporation. The lenders who wield control are typically also the most senior.
Conventional wisdom suggests they have an incentive to steer companies away
from risky projects, even when such projects promise to increase the value of the
enterprise. Moreover, private lenders acquired their powers from managers
whose own interests do not correspond with those of the investors as a group. To
gain breathing space for themselves, old managers will do nothing to stop the
controlling lender from acting in a way that disadvantages those not present.
The self-interested action of senior lenders that imposes the largest risks as
a theoretical matter comes from the liquidation bias of senior lenders. But this
liquidation bias is not likely to be at work when large businesses are reorganized.
To be sure, there is room for slippage. Lenders, in some cases, may pass on
projects that offer positive returns. But financially distressed businesses are
unlikely to have such projects come its way. Even if they do, the senior lender is
likely to be as eager as anyone else to take advantage of them. Senior creditors
now use the bankruptcy process to transform their debt into equity
expeditiously. A prepackaged bankruptcy, lasting perhaps two months, can
recapitalize the corporation. As long as the senior creditor anticipates this
transformation, it effectively enjoys the long-term upside of the business and will
therefore have no liquidation bias.85 We see such dynamics in non-prepackaged

The senior lender’s control of the process can, of course, lead to plans of
reorganization in which it gets a large share of the pie than it is otherwise
entitled, but this exercise of power has, in the first instance, only distributional
consequences. For an exploration of these dynamics, see Douglas G. Baird &
Donald S. Bernstein, xxxxx.
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cases as well. The lenders in Warnaco explored the possibility of a sale, but in the
end decided to retain the core business.

When we survey the types of decisions that senior lenders make with the
control rights they enjoy, most of them involve actions that work to the benefit of
the creditors as a group. These include straightening out the books and putting
in place managers who will shut down inefficient plants and otherwise put the
business back on course. Most managers in organization hone their skills during
times of plenty. Distress often calls for a change in focus. To the extent that the
changes wrought by CROs and their like improve the operation of the business,
all benefit.

A relatively new lending transaction reinforces the idea that senior lenders
take actions that also advance the interests of those junior to them. In these
transactions, lenders take a second position in all of the seniorʹs collateral. They
agree, however, that, should a bankruptcy petition be filed, they will vote as the
senior lender directs. Typical clauses prevent these lien holders from opposing
debtor-in-possession financing endorsed by the senior lien holders or objecting to
asset sales the seniors bless. They even give the senior creditor the authority to
vote the junior’s claim on any proposed plan of reorganization.86 These
instruments are issued by public companies and bought by hedge funds, private
finance companies, and wealthy individuals. Sophisticated professionals
investors are thus willing to acquire these “silent second liens” and bind
themselves to wishes of the senior lender, even though they know that the senior

See Howard Seife, Silent Second Liens, 121 Banking L.J. 771 (2004); Completing
the Capital Structure with a Second Lien Loan, CapitalEyes, Bank of America
Business Capital Newsletter (April 2003).
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creditor’s interests do not correspond with their own. These transactions show
that the interests of the seniors are not necessarily averse to the interest of the
juniors. Rational parties can find it in their mutual interest for senior creditors to
call the shots in bad states of the world. Moreover, such transactions show that
even at the time of the initial transaction when Chapter 11 is far away, parties
pay attention to the way in which control rights will be exercised over the entire
life cycle of the business.

Courts in recent years have taken more seriously the notion that the board’s
allegiance should shift to the creditors when the business finds itself in the “zone
of insolvency.” In the absence of such a shift, the board may incline too much
toward imprudent gambles designed to get them back into the money. Such a
shift of fiduciary duties may be unnecessary, however. Lenders, as we have seen,
are quite capable of taking care of themselves. Rather than add ill-defined
fiduciary duties to the contracts that they write, a better course may be to ensure
that such duties do not impede the exercise of contractual rights for which
creditors have bargained. Indeed, Credit Lyonnaise, the case that put forward the
idea of shifting fiduciary duties in the zone of insolvency, involved a dispute
between creditors that wanted to enforce their control rights and a board that
resisted. The easier it becomes to enforce control rights (and it is already quite
easy), the less one must depend upon judge-made definitions of fiduciary duty to
do the heavy lifting. To the extent that the law does work here, it is to ensure that
directors pay attention when senior lenders air their concerns.87 In the same vein,

See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009 (1997) (suggesting that the importance of Delaware
case law is not that it imposes liability but rather that it establishes norms of
behavior for directors).
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the decline of lender liability may be a positive development, while the
emergence of the tort of deepening insolvency way well not be. Those courts that
refuse to apply equitable subordination when the lender is exercising the rights it
has under it lending agreement should be applauded.

Finally, new corporate reforms that empower boards and make them more
active and independent may improve corporate governance for a reason its
advocates have yet to identify. The more sophisticated and sensible the board of
directors, they more attuned they will be to the levers of power that private
creditors exercise in tough times. As long as legal doctrines such as the risk of
equitable subordination matter, creditor control works most effectively with
boards that understands the hints that are being dropped. Today’s savvy
independent board member rarely worries about the distant threat of a hostile
takeover, but pays attention when the business’s banks come calling.

We thus are cautiously optimistic about the new state of affairs. That said,
we also acknowledge that this new world of increased creditor control certainly
contains the potential for abuse. Again, we use another Chapter 11 case to
illustrate. TWA filed its first Chapter 11 petition in 1992 and its second in 1995.
Even after these two attempts at restructuring, the outlook remained bleak for
the nation’s eighth largest airline. By early 2002, its managers concluded it could
no longer survive on its own. American Airlines entered an agreement to buy
TWA. Chapter 11 was chosen as the vehicle to implement the deal. The original
terms of the agreement were that American would assume $3.5 billion in debt
associated with airplane leases and pay an additional $500 million. Also, there
was a breakup fee of $65 million. In addition to looking for a suitor, TWA needed
an immediate infusion of cash. American provided the bankruptcy financing. It
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made a DIP loan of $200 million, at a rate of 10%.
American may well have been the highest valued user of the TWA assets.
The structure of the transaction, however, points to the possibility of abuse.
American was both a lender to TWA and a bidder for its assets.88 As a lender,
American had access to TWA’s books. It could delve into TWA’s financial
condition to a greater degree than any potential bidding rival. This structure
creates a situation where one party to an auction has an informational advantage
over the other bidders. This informational advantage itself chills bidding from
others.
To be sure, the DIP loan/bid structure in TWA did not completely deter
competition. Another bidder appeared, as did a late bid by TWA’s former
chairman, Carl Icahn. In the end, American prevailed, but only after it raised the
cash portion of its offer by $242 million. It may well be the case that American
could make the most of TWA’s assets, and that they paid a competitive price for
them. Still, the structure of the deal offers the potential for future misuse. Courts,
when faced with a case where the plan is to sell the business at the outset, should
be skeptical of DIP loans made by the leading bidder. They should, when faced
with such a proposal, ensure that there was no alternative source of funding.
Other types of hazards can arise from creditor control, especially because of
the private information they possess that outsiders do not. The potential costs
associated with increased creditor control inside of bankruptcy and out,
however, does not undermine the possibility that the lever of creditor control

We see this pattern in other cases as well, such as the Chapter 11 proceedings
of IT Group and Rhythms Communications.
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may inure to the benefit of all investors as a general matter. Replacing managers
sooner than they otherwise would be may increase the value of the business.
Isolating situations that can cause harm and subjecting them to scrutiny is a
better strategy than attempting to vitiate creditor control across the board.
Even if one were to conclude that creditor control on balance decreases the
value of the business, one must keep in mind that the most obvious ways of
checking creditor control are likely to be counterproductive. For example, a
number of bankruptcy scholars have called for limiting lender control inside of
Chapter 11 and preserving the benefits of the process for junior creditors. But
such changes will surely have unintended consequences. Lenders take control
well in advance of a bankruptcy proceeding. To the extent reforms would allow
them to enjoy substantial freedom outside of bankruptcy but little inside of
bankruptcy, they will take steps to keep businesses outside of Chapter 11, even if
it would bring the highest benefits to investors as a group. In the worst case
scenario, such “reforms” might lead to the piecemeal sale of assets outside of
bankruptcy.89

V. Conclusion
We view cautiously the new landscape in which creditor control has now
become a significant lever of corporate governance. Inside the corporation, no

Chapter 11 allows assets to be sold together and at the same time ensure clean
title. Claims of employees are dealt with in the reorganization and do not follow
the assets. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, 322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003).
Similar assurances are harder to provide outside of bankruptcy. To be sure,
Chapter 11 was never intended to be a forum for senior lenders to sell assets and
ensure buyers that they would receive clean title. Nevertheless, having some
such forum seems a sensible idea.
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one person has the incentive to maximize the value of the business across all
states of the world. One cannot simply put everyone in a room and charge them
to do good. Decisionmaking authority has to be lodged somewhere. Vague
prescriptions touting the value of negotiations among the various parties obscure
the fact that one needs to identify who is making the actual decision, and then
identify both the interest and the skill of that person. Our cautious optimism
about the benefits of creditor control, however, should not obscure a more basic
lesson. Traditional accounts of corporate governance are at a loss to explain cases
like Krispy Kreme, Interstate Baking, or Warnaco. Many of the dominant
figures—such as the CRO—are unknown.90 A large part of modern corporate
governance, at least in the contexts where the most is at stake, has been neglected
for far too long.

The phrase “CRO” has yet to appear in a reported decision. The title “chief
restructuring officer” first appeared in late 2000. There have been 17 references
since, all but five in 2004. Casebooks lag even further behind.
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